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Ubiquitous Media and Monopolies of Knowledge: The Approach of 
Harold Innis​1 
Chapter 10 in Michael Daubs and Vincent Manzerolle (eds.), ​From Here to Ubiquity: Critical and 
International Perspectives on Mobile and Ubiquitous Media​. New York: Peter Lang (forthcoming 2017), 
pp. 183-200. 
Edward Comor​, University of Western Ontario  
Harold Adams Innis (1894–1952) began his career as a political economist and            
economic historian but beginning in the 1930s he turned his attention more to questions              
concerning culture, media, and civilizational survival. Known today mainly for his           
“staples theory” of development and what came to be called “medium theory,” in             
retrospect, Innis charted the foundations of a broadly conceptualized dialectical          
materialist analysis of ubiquitous media. It is in relation to this that Innis forged a               
concept that is particularly germane to the subject of this book: what he called              
monopolies of knowledge.2 
Ubiquitous media, for Innis, are developed and used as means of organizing and             
sustaining power-laden social relations. More than the presence of a pervasive           
technology (in a contemporary context smartphones and automobiles, for example), in           
addressing ubiquity Innis was referencing media (broadly defined to include institutions,           
organizations, and technologies3) that constitute means of producing and reproducing a           
given socio-economic order.4 Innis, having analyzed over four thousand years of           
history, found that the predominance or ubiquity of some media in a given place and               
time reflects and affects—they ​mediate​—that society’s power relations in complex and           
often contradictory ways. 
In this chapter, Innis’ approach to ubiquitous media will be outlined. It will focus on               
how and why such media influence taken-for-granted thinking in a given place and time.              
To explain, the concept “monopoly of knowledge” is applied to two ubiquitous media of              
Innis’ time: the price system and printing. In the first section, some background             
concerning the bases of his interest in media and monopolies of knowledge is provided.              
In the second, what might be called Innis’ approach to ubiquitous media is presented              
and this, in the third section, is demonstrated through the examples of the price system               
and printing. In the penultimate section, his approach is loosely applied to the             
contemporary ubiquity of digital communications technologies. Finally, in the chapter’s          
conclusion, key parts of the argument presented will be summarized and Innis’            
admonition against those treating such an approach as some kind of prognosticative            
template is underlined.  
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As I explain in what follows, the ubiquity of a medium or complex of media generally                
facilitates status quo relations and thinking but, in so doing, it also tends to ossify or                
“bias” that culture’s capacities in relation to knowledge. Ubiquity or monopolization thus            
implies problems and these can impel alternative developments involving, prospectively          
(but not inevitably), a re-casting of the monopolies of knowledge. For Innis, ubiquity             
reflects, shapes, and yields conditions that are contradictory for both dominant interests            
and, in most cases, even those who oppose them.  
CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND  
In the Preface of his book ​Political Economy in the Modern State​, Innis (1946)              
references the apprehensions expressed by Socrates concerning writing and its          
implications for memory: through their use of “written characters” learners “will be            
hearers of many things and have learned nothing; they will appear to be omniscient and               
will generally know nothing; they will be tiresome company, having the show of wisdom              
without the reality.” In the same paragraph, Innis relates this warning to the printing              
press and radio, stating that they also “have enormously increased the difficulties of             
thought” (Innis 1946, vii).  
Here and elsewhere Innis recognizes the Promethean paradox of humanity’s mastery           
over nature: the advance of science and technology, essential as they are to             
civilizational advance, also imply the shackling of the intellect. Indeed, for him, a turning              
point for Western civilization was the invention of the printing press. With the ubiquity of               
the printed word, mechanized ways of thinking flourished. Modern printing technologies           
and their commercial and political applications mediated a certain inter-subjective          
mentality that was decidedly unreflexive (i.e., an absence of critical self–awareness).           
This, from Innis’ perspective, reflected and furthered the capacity to manage,           
administrate, and control—to apply power—on an unprecedented scale. Unreflexive         
and present-minded norms of thinking thus were both consciously promoted (especially           
through advertising, the price system, and mass democracy) and structured into the            
relations of daily life.  
Innis, in the mid-1940s, drawing from the classical dialectic between power (or force)             
and knowledge (or intelligence), points to the growing predominance of power over            
knowledge with technologies, organizations, and institutions mediating their        
(prospectively tragic) imbalance. The struggle between power and knowledge is, for           
Innis, universal in the history of civilization while the specific implications of such             
institutional, organizational, and technological media are not. To underline this, in           
addition to Prometheus, Innis references the myth of Minerva.5 
Innis begins his first dedicated historical analysis of the role played by            
communications in civilizational history (in his paper “Minerva’s Owl”) as follows:           
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“Minerva’s owl begins its flight in the gathering dusk not only from classical Greece but               
in turn from Alexandria, from Rome, from Constantinople, from the republican cities of             
Italy, from France, from Holland, and from Germany” (Innis 1951, 5). Minerva is the              
goddess who embodies force and wisdom. Derived from Athena, she represents the            
dynamic tension between power and knowledge. Her owl—a bird of prey—scavenges           
marginal cultures seeking the materials and ideas needed to sustain and reproduce.            
Rather than just looting or emulation, knowledge can be developed in creative ways             
with the support of power, and power, in turn, is regenerated through living forms of               
knowledge (“living” knowledge refers to forms developed and used to be thoughtful and             
creative while “dead” forms are crafted and applied to administer and control).6 When             
and where this balance takes place, civilization can adapt in the face of crises.7              
However, when power dominates and its agents do not understand their long-term need             
for living knowledge, collapse beckons (Watson 2006, 306–312). 
The owl—once an extension of Minerva’s wisdom—provides Innis with a metaphor           
for the status and treatment of knowledge in the twentieth century. Scholars and other              
intellectuals now are subservient; they furnish the powerful—primarily the state and           
corporations—with tools and techniques needed to administer and control. The powerful           
perpetuate themselves but, under these imbalanced conditions, the creative capacities          
that knowledge and wisdom entail are eradicated. 
More than just a resource to help his contemporaries assess their political-cultural            
conditions with some perspective, Innis, more ambitiously, drew on such mythologies           
and the histories of ancient empires as means of assessing what shapes the             
parameters of cultural capacities. What he referenced as “the Greek tradition” (1946,            
65) was, arguably, the fulcrum of this perspective. 
Before the invention of the Greek alphabet, communication through writing in the            
Near East was inaccessible to all but a small number of mostly religious elites whose               
mastery over an esoteric and thus sacred language separated them and the media they              
monopolized from the vernacular. Their diffusion of knowledge to others mostly involved            
rituals and ecstatic modes of learning. In Greece, the oral tradition—reliant on myth,             
song, poetry, and performance—was itself similarly limiting (a limitation to rational           
thinking that Plato, for one, criticized). Writing using a phonetic alphabet, however,            
enabled people to counterbalance the dominance of their ears and an ecstatic            
education to instead use their eyes through script. Emotive rituals now could be             
complimented or countered through a widely accessible communications system         
removed from the spoken word. As such, the individual’s ordering of his/her own ideas              
(and thus sense of individualism) was significantly advanced (Watson 2006, 370).  
In terms of the dialectic between power and knowledge, this and many other             
examples demonstrate the complexity in Innis’ work—a complexity that is almost           
certainly purposeful. References to power and knowledge invite readers to actively           
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engage their intellectual capacities and Innis, in keeping with this method of            
presentation, refused to champion some form of media determinism. As he puts it in the               
first paragraph of ​The Bias of Communication ​(1951), the papers in that book are an               
attempt to answer the question “Why do we attend to the things to which we attend?”                
Innis then tells us that “They do not answer the question but are reflections stimulated               
by a consideration of it. They emphasize the importance of communication in            
determining ‘things to which we attend’ and suggest also that changes in            
communication will follow changes in ‘the things to which we attend’” (xliii).  
Here Innis states that changes in communication follow changes in the things to             
which we attend. Innis’ concept of bias clearly is not about the inherent conceptual and               
sensual orientations inscribed through media; bias, instead, is a heuristic tool used to             
assess the historical determinants shaping power-knowledge dialectics. Rather than a          
master concept applied to find ​the ​truth, bias is applied as a means of investigating why                
dominant truths are conceptualized as they are. In fact, bias served an almost             
secondary role for Innis—secondary and supportive to his more general concerns           
regarding power relations and what he termed “monopolies of knowledge.”  
INNIS’ APPROACH TO UBIQUITOUS MEDIA  
Through monopolies of knowledge we find what is, in essence, Innis’ approach to             
ubiquitous media. For him, space and time are the two fundamental indices of human              
existence, not just organizationally but also in terms of perception and understanding.            
The need to comprehend and control both is, for him, a profound and complex endeavor               
not least because they are the subjects of ongoing change. “The concepts of time and               
space,” he writes, “must be made ​relative and elastic ​and the attention given by the               
social scientist to problems of space should be paralleled by attention to problems of              
time” (Innis 1946, 34. Emphases added).  
Controlling or monopolizing knowledge—control over both the information available         
and how it is interpreted—prospectively takes place through predominant and, certainly,           
ubiquitous media.8 Media, in effect, enable not only a dominant way of organizing             
society, they also facilitate appropriate or common sense ways of thinking. There is, in              
fact, a link between the development or presence of ubiquitous media and such             
monopolies but it is not a direct causal relationship. Moreover, the use of a ubiquitous               
medium does not itself yield a monopoly of knowledge, but in its absence, the capacity               
to develop and sustain such a monopoly is questionable. 
For Innis, media are the relational environments through which human interactions           
take place. They reflect and influence biases. Biases, generally, constitute our           
conceptual capacities—the parameters in which information and experience are         
processed into what is knowable. Simply put, how a medium is structured—whether it is              
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writing, the price system, a bureaucracy, or the Internet—influences how people using it             
think. Ultimately, the materialization of such biases through social structures and a            
society’s inter-subjectivities constitute the framework for what is thinkable and          
imaginable.9 
Over the long course of civilizational history, Innis tells us that empires come and go               
alongside their capacity (or incapacity) to sustain and control political economic           
activities. In this ​longue durée ​analysis, ubiquitous media constitute crucial intellectual           
and structural nodal points through which social-economic relations are established and           
extended over time and space. The development and maintenance of an empire thus             
involves the capacity to recognize and respond to the endogenous and exogenous            
problems that such mediated conditions entail. Media are developed, entrenched, or           
reformed in response. Successful empires can do this while others fall into crises. 
Informing this historical pattern was, to repeat, a dialectic that Innis was familiar with              
in part through his encounters with the work of classicists—that between power and             
knowledge. Power (involving coercive mechanisms and force) needs knowledge (often          
in the hands of specialists and elites) that can be applied to organization and              
administration. Those in commanding positions (particularly political, economic, and         
military leaders) tend to focus on such dimensions to the neglect of more reflexive and               
critical forms of knowledge (knowledge usually produced by intellectuals, artists, and           
even political dissenters). In other words, those in power occupying the centre or core              
are compelled to dominate the intellectual and political margins. The core, however,            
needs what the margins produce—from wealth to creative thinking—in order to (at least             
in the long term) reproduce itself. Power’s necessary dominance over knowledge thus            
constitutes a threat to itself. 
Power tends to dominate knowledge—promoting and using what Innis would refer to            
as “dead” forms of knowledge—yet power also needs another kind of           
knowledge—”living” knowledge—in order to successfully respond to the (inevitable)         
problems facing the system or empire. In sum, living (self-reflective, creative, critical)            
forms of knowledge are needed as a resource for thinking differently; to, in effect,              
counterbalance the tendency towards a monopolization of knowledge. As Innis (1951,           
34) recognizes (and warns) in ​The Bias of Communication​, 
The use of a medium of communication over a long period will to some extent               
determine the character of knowledge to be communicated and suggest that its            
pervasive influence will eventually create a civilization in which life and flexibility will             
become exceedingly difficult to maintain. 
A sustainable society, empire, or civilization thus must possess the capacity to resist its              
own biases and ossification. This capacity is not (simplistically) the outcome of some             
kind of liberal tolerance of marginal groups who wish to communicate and express             
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themselves (i.e., outcomes of, in a contemporary context, access to the Internet and             
entrenched civil and speech rights). Such human rights, while theoretically desirable,           
are not directly equated, in Innis, with the capacity to think reflexively and produce living               
forms of knowledge.10 Nor is this capacity seen to be an inevitable outcome of an               
individual’s or group’s marginalized status. Instead, Innis recognizes that ​a monopoly of            
knowledge can engulf not just elites but also a society’s most exploited and intellectually              
radical elements​.  
With this and the overarching power-knowledge dialectic in mind, we can read one of              
Innis’ most widely cited passages with some precision. In ​Empire and Communications​,            
he outlines his oft-quoted theory of technology and time/space bias: 
The concepts of time and space ​reflect ​the significance of media to civilization. Media              
that ​emphasize ​time are those that are durable in character, such as parchment, clay,              
and stone…. Media that ​emphasize ​space are ​apt ​to be less durable and light in               
character, such as papyrus and paper. The latter are ​suited to ​wide areas in              
administration and trade….Materials that emphasize time ​favour ​decentralization and         
hierarchical types of institutions, while those that ​emphasize ​space ​favour          
centralization and systems of government less hierarchical in character. Large-scale          
political organizations such as empires must be considered from the standpoint of            
two dimensions, those of space and time. ​Empires persist by overcoming the bias of              
media which overemphasizes either dimension​. They have ​tended ​to flourish under           
conditions in which civilization ​reflects ​the influence of more than one medium, and in              
which the bias of one medium towards decentralization is ​offset ​by the bias of              
another medium towards centralization. (Innis 1950, 5. Emphases added)  
The reader will note that Innis, in relating media to an empire’s control over space or                
time, stresses how their characteristics emphasize propensities, not concrete         
necessities, and that they entail tendencies rather than determining factors. Media, in            
other words, imply the structuring of capacities—the parameters of what is possible or             
impossible, imaginable or unimaginable. Spatial or temporal biases emerge from the           
use of technological, organizational, and institutional mediators in the pursuit and           
administration of (or resistance to) power. The predominance of particular mediators in            
a given place and time reflects and tends to perpetuate general biases. These biases              
are shaped by and, in turn, shape the formation of particular ways or systems of               
thinking and, more abstractly, monopolies of knowledge.  
In most of his writings Innis uses the concept of a monopoly of knowledge liberally. In                
“Minerva’s Owl,” for example, he writes that  
I have attempted to suggest that Western civilization has been profoundly influenced            
by communication and that marked changes in communications have had important           
implications…I have attempted to trace the implications of the media of           
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communication for the character of knowledge and to suggest that a monopoly or an              
oligopoly of knowledge is built up to the point that equilibrium is disturbed. (Innis              
1951: 3) 
In just this paper, Innis lists an array of influential technologies (most directly clay, the               
stylus, cuneiform script, papyrus, the brush, hieroglyphics and hieratic writing, the pen,            
the alphabet, parchment, paper, printing, the printing press, celluloid, and radio) in what             
can be read as an overview of the rise and fall of monopolies of knowledge. Also, Innis                 
addresses the development and implications of many dozens of other          
media—technologies, organizations, and institutions. For example, the ancient        
development of the horse and chariot facilitated the unity of city states primarily through              
the use of force but also through the corporal awareness of Rome’s power that this               
military technology entailed. The use of coins after 700 BCE provided for both the              
flexible development of market systems and the capacity to further abstractify the nature             
of human relationships. The development of libraries and museums enabled both the            
conservation and utilization of the past. The Roman contract clarified obligations and            
reduced the costly need for public ceremony. The rise of monasticism provided the             
Roman Catholic Church with agents who reproduced (selections of) written knowledge           
while also promoting faith and the bible throughout Europe. The rise of commerce             
involved institutions that encouraged exchange, individualism, and order. Advertising         
promoted aspects of existing reality and stimulated new and more abstract realities. In             
these and many other examples, institutions, organizations, and technologies are          
developed, applied, or modified to mediate capacities concerning power and          
knowledge. They extend existing relations and open up potentials for their disruption. 
THE PRICE SYSTEM AND PRINTING 
Let us now be more specific on how the concept “monopoly of knowledge” is related to                
Innis’ analyses of ubiquitous media. In this section, I do this through a brief              
consideration of two relatively contemporary examples: the price system and printing. 
The price system is the predominant means of valuing what people exchange using             
monetary representations—representations that, by the twentieth century, constituted a         
dominant means of understanding economic relations and policymaking. Innis began          
his critique of the price system by demonstrating the inaccurate and even delusional             
aspects of its use. What had been a relatively rational measurement of human             
preferences in relation to resources became the central mechanism through which           
imbalances in (or a disequilibrium between) desires and capabilities were understood           
and worked out. Innis thus critiques more than just the price system’s influence in              
capitalist development; he also assesses its implications in modern thought.  
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The price system is a predominant institution providing unprecedentedly complex          
economic relations with both their grease and glue. As such it mediates and             
fundamentally influences human thought through its concrete applications and in how it            
is used to organize abstract relations and ideas. Assessing its impact, Innis traces the              
price system’s development from the efforts of European states to administer           
mercantilist activities involving the importation of gold and silver to subsequent           
developments in the construction of classical political economy to its use as a means of               
managing (and legitimizing) political economic relations promoted by powerful vested          
interests. Thus, through its pervasive use, the favored calculations or valuations of            
merchants, industrialists, bankers, accountants, state administrators, and others (such         
as advertisers and modern corporations) came to take precedence as reified ways of             
thinking.  
A monopoly of knowledge thus can be structured through the ubiquitous use of such              
a medium. More than this, however, Innis was disturbed by how such monopolies             
became entrenched in ways of thinking that are largely unperceived and           
self-perpetuating. In the case of the price system, through its material and intellectual             
pervasiveness, it became a means through which its own faux neutrality was            
reproduced and applied in everything from the calculations used to declare war to the              
costs and benefits of staying in a marriage. The price system, according to Innis, has               
even limited our capacity to imagine the future by funneling our community and personal              
values through a prism of monetary and mathematical calculations. “The successful           
politician,” writes Innis (1946, 165), “is precluded from policies which indicate class or             
self-interest but he is successful in so far as he succeeds in enlisting the support of the                 
price system.”  
The ubiquity of the price system and its largely unspoken advantages for some             
interests over others enables its perpetuation and encloses both expert and common            
sense thinking in an invisible cage that delimits the boundaries of reality. For example,              
given the price system’s institutionalization in the seventeenth century in response to            
the vast influx of gold from the new world, he writes that “It would be interesting to                 
speculate on the history of economic thought if England had been an important             
producer of precious metals and not an importer and an exporter” (​ibid.​, 146). The price               
system, while initially counter-balancing the irrationalities of religion, subsequently         
perpetuated biases that enabled control while, in so doing, it also framed the             
parameters of creativity.11  
The price system’s “dangers,” writes Innis (​ibid.​, ix), “follow obsession and           
intolerance to a philosophical interest and skepticism.” It is in this context—the tendency             
of “dead” forms of knowledge to overwhelm the “living”—that Innis assesses the first             
half of the twentieth century in a way that emphasizes the extraordinary implications of              
such intellectual mechanisms: 
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The outbreak of irrationality, which in the early part of the twentieth century became              
evident in the increasing interest in psychology following the steadying effects of            
commerce in the nineteenth century, is the tragedy of our time. The rationalizing             
potentialities of the price system and its importance in developing powers of            
calculation in the individual have failed to prevent a major collapse. It has been              
argued that man as a biological phenomenon has been unable to sustain the             
excessive demands of rationalism evident in the mathematics of the price system and             
of technology. (Innis 1946: 98–99) 
As for another ubiquitous medium—printing—Innis stresses its importance in terms of           
what he calls the mechanization of knowledge. Rapid economic growth, particularly           
dating from industrialization in the nineteenth century, and the related rise of democracy             
and public opinion (mostly through literacy and the commercial press) entailed the            
development of media (institutions, organizations, and technologies) enabling growth         
and control over workers/consumers/citizens. This complex of developments directly         
implied the ubiquitous availability and use of printed forms of communication. 
With wood pulp replacing rags as the raw material for newsprint, and with a train of                
print technology developments (driven most overtly by the demands of advertisers),           
mass market journalism flourished by the end of the nineteenth century. Changes in             
other areas of publishing emerged also; changes molded, perhaps most significantly,           
through the growing power of voters and consumers. What was called “the new             
journalism”—the penny press being an extreme form—was facilitated by (and itself           
influenced) broader and deeper cultural developments. In this history, through his           
understanding of center-margin relations and the power-knowledge dialectic, Innis saw          
media being used in a paradoxical way: power seemingly was being decentralized            
through democracy and the rising influence of public opinion but these also constituted             
means of controlling polities and markets. The demands of the working class, for             
example, were funneled through mediators (such as advertising-sponsored        
newspapers) that both fragmented intellectual capacities and incorporated dissent         
through another institutional development—mass consumption. 
In this process, journalistic and other writing standards were debased. But also in the              
context of these changes, some news organizations turned away from “spuriousness”           
and, instead, promoted “accuracy and truth,” especially as the former was not in             
keeping with the newspaper’s emerging role as the medium of their advertisers            
supposed truthfulness (Innis 1946, 27–28). Nevertheless, in seeking to accommodate          
mass readerships on behalf of capitalist interests, and in light of the growing competition              
facing the press with more sensually-engaging media such as cinema and radio,            
newspapers and other printed communications came to demonstrate an antipathy to           
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“the deep intensity of thought” (Babe and Comor 2018, n.p.; Sir Walter Scott, quoted in               
Innis 1946, 30). 
Printing, as a technology developed in conjunction with (and in support of ) other              
influential developments, promulgated a general interest in current events, accessible          
explanations, and seeing-is-believing standards of “truth” (the latter typically involving          
images and statistics). The development of mass education, for example, involved the            
state-sponsored rise of textbook publishing. Beyond its political and nationalistic          
implications, Innis (​ibid.​, 100) argues that the textbook “has become…a powerful           
instrument for the closing of men’s minds” due to, among other things, “its emphasis on               
memory and its systematic checking of new ideas” through indexes and their            
re-publication as updated editions. “Biases,” Innis continues, “become entrenched in          
textbooks which represent monopolies of the publishing trade and resist the power of             
thought.”12  
Textbooks enabled power (through the state) to manage the dissemination of           
knowledge and, in so doing, particular forms of knowledge were perpetuated. Even            
Canada’s universities were compelled to conform. They were (and still are), after all,             
publicly funded. As such, research and teaching activities—particularly in the context of            
a present-minded and price system dominated culture—have to be substantiated in           
terms of their demonstrable (as opposed to abstract and long-term) contributions. As            
with the newspaper, in the university the timeliness of knowledge and its relevancy to              
contemporary (and often fashionable) concerns became increasingly valued. Both         
journalism and academia actively perpetuated this shift and the volume, subject matter,            
and quality of publications reflected this directly.  
The ubiquity of printing enabled an explosion of information and knowledge in largely             
debased and vernacular forms and the qualitative dimensions of knowledge were, in            
effect, flattened.13 Partially in response to this (and enabled by the unprecedented            
availability of print technology), specializations flourished. More than just advertising          
and its immediate gratification priorities had come to dominate cultural norms and            
intellectual pursuits.  
The upshot, for Innis, has been the mechanization (and deadening) of knowledge            
and, through this, some disturbing developments. Indeed, Innis characterized the          
nineteenth century as a period of relative rationalism while, in light of the changes              
mediated through the price system, industrialized printing, and other ubiquitous media,           
the twentieth was characterized by an irrationalism yielding “a century of war” (​ibid.​, 55;              
Babe and Comor 2018, n.p.). Publications addressing increasingly isolated fields and           
sub-fields revealed, for him, a lack of perspective that is both spatial (as with              
cross-at-your-own-peril boundaries of expertise) and temporal (especially in terms of the           
present-mindedness that most specializations imply).14  
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The unprecedented availability of information and the precision afforded by print           
technologies constituted something very different from a democratization of knowledge          
and the foundations for a more thoughtful society. Academic knowledge, for one thing,             
was being produced and thought about in more functional, instrumental, and exacting            
terms, rather than in terms of its value as a means of reflection, critique, and even                
collective understanding. “Knowledge,” Innis observes, instead “has been divided to the           
extent that it is apparently hopeless to expect a common point of view” (Innis 1951,               
190). According to Innis (1946, 126): 
The rapid growth of bureaucracies recruited from highly specialized social sciences           
has brought the rapid growth of ecclesiasticism and the rapid decline of scepticism.             
Democracies are becoming people who cannot understand, run by people buttressed           
and protected by the ramparts of research.…[In the words of Locke] ‘The greater part              
cannot learn and therefore they must believe.’ 
The mechanization and mass consumption of printed communications propagated,         
through both form and content, the value of the new, the practical, and the intellectually               
manageable. This, for Innis, constituted a fundamental contradiction. Industrial scale          
printing enabled and embodied a pernicious compounding of the short-term and           
unreflexive thinking that had become lauded as an inherently democratic and thus            
unimpeachable right. But in the absence of even those on the political and intellectual              
margins (for example, many workers as well as artists and intellectuals concentrating on             
mostly “living” forms of knowledge) having the capacity to recognize this decline of             
thoughtfulness, the ahistorical (if not suicidal) drumbeat of “progress” continued. More           
than this, Innis viewed the rapid development of efficient and more “perfect” methods of              
communication to be compounding this mostly invisible crisis. Beyond the many           
specializations these afford, the power to produce and circulate sounds and images            
portraying “reality” would mediate even more time-neglecting forms of knowledge.          
Power (Minerva), in effect, was treating knowledge (her owl) as a pet rather than a               
means of enlightenment and survival (Watson 2006, 309). The “enormous capacity” of            
Western civilization “to loot,” writes Innis (​ibid.​, 102), particularly through the ubiquity of             
increasingly realistic mediations, “has left little opportunity for consideration of the           
problems which follow the exhaustion of [cultural and intellectual] material to be looted.” 
TOWARDS AN INNISIAN APPROACH TO UBIQUITOUS DIGITAL MEDIA 
To summarize, the ubiquity of a medium facilitates or provides the capacity for the              
emergence or entrenchment of some form of monopoly of knowledge. While the            
medium itself does not determine this monopolization, the ways in which a medium             
structures, or enables the production and communication of some kinds of information            
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over others and some ways of thinking in relation to others are its most germane               
implications. The price system and printing demonstrate this and so too might an             
Innisian analysis of digital communications technologies. 
As with other ubiquitous media, Innis certainly would assess digital technologies in            
the context of a complex of political economic and cultural dynamics and in relation to               
other influential mediators. Monopolies of knowledge, such as the mechanistic,          
specialized, organizational, administrative forms of knowledge dominating much of the          
twentieth century (and related biases concerning spatial control to the neglect of time),             
are neither automatically perpetuated nor transformed by the wide scale introduction of            
such a medium. Moreover, as an historicist, Innis would argue that we cannot fully              
comprehend the implications of any emergent technology, organization, or institution          
until time gives us the perspective needed to make such an assessment.  
Having said this, however, following his efforts to comprehend the uses and            
implications of the predominant media of his time, we can at least begin an Innisian               
analysis of ubiquitous digital media by recognizing them to have been built within (and              
in response to) the parameters of existing media (broadly defined) and the general             
dynamics driving (and the capacities framing) their development. The price system, for            
example, was and remains an institutionalized means of organizing and facilitating           
economic (and other) activities in ways that are constitutive of a particular political             
economic order and the values and vested interests it supports. Likewise, printing            
enables some powerful interests to maintain or extend their control over a society’s             
wealth and common sense thinking involving the capacity to shape public opinion            
through education, advertising, and the allocation of or specialized control over such            
resources. Viewed historically, the ubiquity of these media has been and remains a             
reflection of their enormous usefulness and flexibilities especially (but not exclusively)           
as nodal points of power among both status quo and competing interests. If for no other                
reason, ubiquitous media become ubiquitous because they are handy to vested           
interests. The consequences of their use, however, are not always predictable as the             
dynamics and factors shaping history are too complex.  
For Innis, history provides us with the potential to assess the present with some              
perspective, enabling us to identify general tendencies and patterns that we might apply             
to contemporary developments. For one thing, established cultural and economic          
capacities and dynamics shape the structuring of emergent media while older media are             
compelled to change in response to the demands mediated by the successful new             
ones. The owners, editors, and writers of newspapers and books, for example, in their              
responses to radio and cinema, modified their products in order to be more attractive              
and accessible (mostly through simplifications, sensationalism, photography, color        
printing, comics, etc.). Today, in light of the “obvious” advantages of online forms of              
journalism, most newsprint versions are deemed to be a waste of time (and             
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money)—especially for advertisers—and the book, through its many digitized iterations,          
is becoming a hybrid vehicle crafted to engage consumers even more sensually (as             
opposed to intellectually) than it had in the past. Through this technological            
“progress”—involving the book’s “democratization” and “liberation” from publishers—the        
value of concentration, reflection, and long-term considerations (not to mention the           
prestige of the author and the written word itself) likely are being further marginalized.15              
As Innis (1951, 82–83) observed, such spatially biased developments—i.e., the          
unprecedented reach and accessibility of online publications—make it “increasingly         
difficult to achieve continuity or to ask for a consideration of the future.” 
Part of this annihilation of time involves, for Innis, an understanding of the pressures              
facing people in our time—given that “time is money” and “money is time” (George              
Gissing quoted in Innis 1951, 83)—and that new media enable us to live more of our                
lives without having to engage in the difficult and time-consuming task of            
critical/self-reflexive thought. Representations of reality—like assumptions that “Truth” is         
the outcome of scientific and mathematical applications—have been perfected through          
digital technologies. However, as Innis quotes Geoffrey Scott, “It is…the last sign of an              
artificial civilisation when Nature takes the place of art” (Scott quoted in Innis 1951:              
193). What Innis means by this becomes apparent in the following excerpt from his              
essay “A Plea for Time”: 
The effects of new media of communication evident in the outbreak of the Second              
World War were intensified during the progress of the war. They were used by the               
armed forces in the immediate prosecution of the war and in propaganda both at              
home and against the enemy. In Germany moving pictures of battles were taken and              
shown in theatres almost immediately afterwards. The German people were given an            
impression of realism which compelled them to believe in the superiority of German             
arms; realism became not only most convincing but also with the collapse of the              
German front most disastrous. In some sense ​the problem of the German people is              
the problem of Western civilization​. ​As modern developments in communication have           
made for greater realism they have made for greater possibilities of delusion. ​(Innis             
1951: 81–82. Emphases added) 
In the absence of an innate capacity to recognize that information and experience are              
not themselves objective realities, the technological mastery of media presents the           
individual and the mass public with little room for interpretation (i.e., nature over art). In               
this observation, Innis harkens back to the concerns that Plato says were expressed by              
Socrates with the advent of the Greek alphabet and writing (as quoted earlier). To              
repeat, as Innis (1946, vii) quotes Socrates in ​Phaedrus​, with writing, people will convey              
“the show of wisdom without the reality.” 
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In a world mediated, regulated, and governed through mostly unquestioned          
representations (prices as values; printed words as truths; digital technologies          
mimicking concrete experiences), ways of thinking that entail little or no reflection (let             
alone historical or philosophical perspective) are normalized. Thoughts, let alone          
actionable concerns, about society’s long-term duration thus become further         
marginalized; they are deemed to be a waste of time and money, especially in a political                
economy and culture that perpetually lacks the former and values, more than anything             
else, the latter.  
An Innisian analysis, furthermore, would recognize that digital technologies reflect          
and extend capitalism’s (and, more generally, power’s) emphasis on timeliness and           
efficiency in decision-making and, indeed, daily life itself.16 As with Innis’ recognition            
that biases tend to be self-perpetuating, this closing off of reflexive thinking in effect              
undercuts critiques concerning the monopoly of mechanized knowledge. In a cultural           
environment stressing individualism and efficiency and in the absence of          
time-consuming reflexive capacities, all kinds of digitally-mediated communications are         
embraced as the priorities and values they facilitate are both pervasive and seemingly             
obvious.  
Innis, of course, assessing contemporary developments through his historical         
perspective and historicist epistemology, underlined that such media-facilitated        
monopolies of knowledge are inherently contradictory. Power appears to be served as            
Minerva’s owl has been all but caged. Amidst splintering attention spans and            
fashion-induced moments of dissent, powerful vested interests (including, when         
organized, the citizens of liberal democracies) tend to focus their energies on            
management and control rather than conceptualizing (let alone forging) radically          
different ways of thinking. More generally, this neglect of time—particularly the value of             
understanding history, the time required to reflect, and the imagination and creativity            
needed to think about alternatives—compels the Innisian analyst to consider          
contemporary developments involving digital technologies to be far less liberating than           
many assume them to be. Here we would do well to recall the myth of Prometheus.  
From Innis’ study of history—a study driven in part by his quest to develop an               
alternate (relatively unbiased) perspective—he tells us that the margins of any political            
economic system and culture have the greatest capacity to resist, particularly given their             
removal from the full force of the core’s framing dynamics and mediated realities.17 In              
their struggles with the core (or political economic empire) they may be compelled to              
adapt dominant media in light of their own needs and interests. This, for Innis, is not                
necessarily the basis for revolution but, instead, it constitutes an important means of             
countering monopolies of knowledge. To use his preferred language, marginal demands           
may constitute part of a system’s unused capacities and, thus, new ways of thinking              
may emerge as a result of center-margin tensions and dynamics.  
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As Innis’ work reveals, however, imperial centers draw from or directly loot the             
economic and cultural resources of their margins as they are primary sources for ideas              
and innovation. The systemic drives associated with capitalism compel new means of            
control, new bases for resistance and, indeed, the potential for cultural vibrancy. But in              
our contemporary context, through the price system and other ubiquitous media           
(including digital technologies used to educate, advertise, market, and “stay connected           
all the time”), Innis’ concerns about spatial control, the mechanization of knowledge,            
and an immediate future of misunderstanding and instability appear to be warranted. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Under the conditions of their contemporary use, digitally mediated communications          
provide instantaneous knowledge. Their seeing-is-believing qualities facilitate what Innis         
might call the delusion of certainty. Specializations are perpetuated and publics           
gravitate towards the less time-consuming and intellectually supportive views of          
like-minded others. Arrogance and narcissism deepen as truths are pontificated based           
on not much more than experientially-informed reckonings and prejudices. The reach           
and perfection of digital communications likely would prompt Innis to reiterate his            
statement that: 
Enormous improvements in communication have made understanding more difficult.         
Even science, mathematics, and music as the last refuge of the Western mind have              
come under the spell of the mechanized vernacular. Commercialism has required the            
creation of new monopolies in language and new difficulties in understanding. (Innis            
1951, 31) 
Innis also observes that the introduction a new medium tends to “check the bias of the                
first [and dominant medium] and to create conditions suited to the growth of empire”              
(Innis 1950, 169). In other words, there is a tendency for power to adjust its course as a                  
result of the counterbalance to its monopoly of knowledge that may emerge through the              
use of a new (and perhaps ubiquitous) medium. Barring complete collapse—a           
development that in the twentieth century he associated with another, now           
atomic/nuclear, world war—Innis, however, does not anticipate anything remotely         
revolutionary. 
Perhaps today’s rapid development of ubiquitous digital media constitutes this very           
occurrence: digital media somehow constituting a check and counterbalance to print (or,            
as McLuhan put it, the dominance of typographical man). Certainly, other ubiquitous            
media—such as the price system—are not directly threatened by digitization. However,           
a goal of this chapter has been to point out that such general tendencies are, for Innis,                 
not laws of history. There is no, to borrow from some Marxists, immanent dialectic at               
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work (except, arguably, the trans-historical dialectic between power and knowledge).          
Innis’ dialectical materialism is, instead, historically conditional in that Innis resisted           
what he criticized others for following: ossified schools of thought generating           
mechanized forms of knowledge. 
Nevertheless, from an Innisian perspective, the transition to digital media seems to            
constitute the widening and deepening of pre-existing conditions more than the           
mediation of a new period of cultural vibrancy. Certainly something new is taking shape              
but, most likely, this is unfolding through an entrenched monopoly of knowledge and,             
therefore, the dawning of a more reactionary political culture—”reactionary” on the part            
of not just the right and left but the center also.  
What Innis provides analysts conducting research on the subject of ubiquitous media            
is an approach that compels us to focus on the structural and intellectual capacities at               
hand, the complex dynamics and mediations at play, and the generally unseen tensions             
and contradictions that may be at work. Innis’ understanding of ubiquitous media is             
slippery and complicated and, thus, prone to simplifications bordering on assessments           
akin to some kind of media determinism. In this chapter, following Watson (2006), I              
have argued that the most productive link to Innis’ concerns is not some straightforward              
analysis of media bias but, instead, it is to relate ubiquitous media to monopolies of               
knowledge and, more broadly, the dialectic between power and knowledge.  
In monopolies of knowledge, assumptions about the truth fatally supersede “the           
search ​for truth” (Innis 1946, 126. Emphasis added). In pursuing questions concerning            
the development and implications of ubiquitous media, Innis would underline this very            
point as both a guide and a warning.18  
NOTES  
1. This chapter was written while preparing, with co-editor Robert Babe, the            
re-publication of Innis’s ​Political Economy in the Modern State ​(Toronto: University           
of Toronto Press, 2018). Through that project he played an important role in the              
intellectual development of what I present herein, and I recognize that portions of             
this chapter echo parts of our work for that book. I also acknowledge the              
assistance of Vincent Manzerolle for his thoughtful input during the chapter’s           
development. Finally, I am compelled to dedicate this chapter to the late Professor             
Ian Parker. His influence on my understanding of Innis’ work has been            
immeasurable.  
2. Although I have found no direct (let alone sustained) use of the term “ubiquitous               
media” in Innis’ work, in what follows I hope to demonstrate his interest in the               
subject.  
17 
3. Institutions, in Innis’ works, refer to both formal institutions (such as the Church)              
and the more socio-economic (such as the price system). Organizations generally           
reference headquartered collectivities such as banks, political parties, or         
universities. Technologies, it should be noted, also imply techniques (his          
references to print, for instance, involve abilities related to literacy).  
4. For Marx, the commodity form (conceptualized as an institution) might be said to              
mediate such contemporary relations while, for Innis, what he called the price            
system was central in similar (but more limited) ways.  
5. Later in his career, during the 1940s, Innis came to appreciate Greek mythology as               
an ideal-type form of knowledge in that it embodied both the vibrancy of orality              
(particularly at the time of Plato, at the dawn of writing) in conjunction with its               
capacity to communicate ontologically objective truths concerning shared        
conditions. Alexander John Watson (2006, 301) suggests that Innis’ critique of           
monopolies of knowledge drew from similar themes found in Greek mythology.  
6. Innis’ understanding of power developed from a political economy-based relational           
and structural conceptualization (as in his earlier research on Canadian economic           
history) into an approach characterized by a complex of relations in which            
power/force and knowledge/intelligence constitute dialectically interdependent      
capacities.  
7. According to Innis, “The success of organized force is dependent on an effective              
combination of the oral tradition and the vernacular in public opinion with            
technology and science.” (Innis 1951, 5).  
8. Although Innis never used the term ubiquitous to describe an institution,            
organization, or technology, the engaged reader can discern quantitative and          
qualitative differences between media that are predominant and those that are           
ubiquitous at a given place and time. In his six years of dedicated writing on media                
and communications (1946–1952), various media such as radio, the automobile,          
and roads had become predominant while the price system, print capitalism, and            
the state were ubiquitous.  
9. Of course, the material properties of media foundationally shape the capacities of             
such structures.  
10. On democracy as practiced in the mid-twentieth century, quoting François Guizot,            
Innis writes that “It readily sacrifices the past and the future to what is supposed to                
be the interest of the present” (Innis 1946: 95).  
11. In Marx, something very similar can be seen in the predominance of the              
commodity form and its profound implications in social relations. Its ubiquity—more           
abstract and defining than Innis’ concerns about the price system—mediate          
concrete/living relations through the predominance of abstractions.  
18 
12. On the other hand, “Abolition of standard texts in favour of the publication of a                
wide variety of books increases the cost of education to the publishers, the state,              
and the purchaser of books, but it tends to break down broad stereotypes” (Innis              
1946, 162).  
13. The first two chapters of Innis’ (1946) ​Political Economy in the Modern State​, for               
example, explore and demonstrate this theme through the history of the           
newspaper in the United States and Britain and the modern press in England.  
14. On this second point, as the interests and exclusionary vocabularies of specialists             
develop, their work becomes less accessible to others and, as such, their primary             
readership are similarly specialized administrators, scholars, and bureaucrats.  
15. It is in this cultural context that pension fund investments and insurance issues              
are worth losing sleep over but seemingly abstract concerns involving, for           
example, ecological survival or the proliferation of nuclear weapons are, for most,            
mere “issues.”  
16. More generally, as classical political economists (most notably, Marx) first           
recognized, capitalism is a historically unique form of production (and reproduction)           
entailing, through legal and other modes of abstractification, a ​systemic drive ​to            
expand the accumulation of capital and, in the process, shorten the time frames of              
all kinds of social relations.  
17. Through his direct and indirect references to center-margin and core-periphery           
relations, Innis alludes to a range of structural and cultural conditions that, to             
repeat, elaborate classical power-knowledge dialectics. His use of space-time         
dialectics in his later writings is an obvious example (both alluding to tensions and              
contradictions involving the capacity to control and think reflexively). Implicit in this            
ever-mediating dynamic is the complexity of hegemonic power, entailing both          
coercive and consensual capacities.  
18. Indeed, in the first paragraph of his Preface to ​Political Economy in the Modern               
State​, Innis writes that “The volume is intended as a guide and as a warning”               
(1946, vii). 
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